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1 INTRODUCTION  
Many international human rights 
instruments require States to introduce 
domestic measures in their territories to 
ensure the protection and promotion of 
human rights.1 This may be mainly 
attributed to the fact that States are 
generally held accountable or regarded 
as being responsible when international 
human rights obligations are not 
observed or given effect to.2  To achieve 
effective domestic protection of human 
rights it is important that the 
**The author is grateful to Ms Chesne Albertus, 
Department of Criminal Law and Procedure, 
University of the Western Cape, for the 
comments on this paper. 
1Steiner HJ, Alston P &Goodman R International 
human rights in context: law, politics, morals; text 
and materials (Oxford: OUP 2007) at 1123. See 
also Shaw M International law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2008) at 268. 
2Evans M International law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2010) at 290.  
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introduction of pro-human rights laws is accompanied by a network of complementary 
norms and mechanisms to co-ordinate or supervise the implementation of such laws.3 
In order to ensure the domestic protection of human rights, the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe establishes the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC).4 In 
accordance with the Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris 
Principles)5, the Constitution mandates the ZHRC with a primary role of promoting and 
protecting human rights at all levels of society.6 The aim of this article is to look at the 
prospects of and challenges to the ZHRC in its quest to promote and protect human 
rights. 
2 INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
According to Reif, independent National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) which have 
emerged out of the human rights movement play a great role in the protection and 
promotion of human rights.7 The importance of NHRIs has been widely recognised by 
the United Nations human rights bodies since 1946.8 In 1992 the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights adopted the Guiding Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (Paris Principles) and these Principles were also adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1993.9 The Paris Principles provide significant guidance and 
direction on the establishment of NHRIs in general, and also provide standards and 
principles that NHRIs must follow in order to function effectively.  
The Paris Principles provide benchmarks against which proposed, new and 
existing NHRIs can be assessed and “accredited” by the International Coordinating 
Committee’s Sub-Committee on Accreditation (ICC SCA).10 The International 
Coordinating Committee (ICC) of NHRIs was established with the aim of co-ordinating 
the activities of NHRIs at international level, and to develop joint programmes of action 
for NHRIs around the world.11 It was also established to support the creation and 
strengthening of NHRIs and to liaise with international human rights organisations, 
3Reif LC “Building democratic institutions: the role of national human rights institutions in good 
governance and human rights protection” (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 at 2. 
4S 242 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
5Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. 
6S 243 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
7Reif (2000) at 2. 
8United Nations Centre for Human Rights National human rights institutions: a handbook on the 
establishment and strengthening of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights 
Professional Training Series No 4 at 4-6 UN Doc HR/P/PT/4, UN Sales No E.95.XIV.2 (1995).   
9GA Res 134, UN GAOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/48/134 (1993). 
10OHCHR National human rights institutions; history, principles, roles, and responsibilities (New York: 
United Nations 2010) at 31. 
11See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at para 66. 
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such as, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).12 In 1998, the 
ICC developed rules of procedures and created a process for accrediting institutions. 
The ICC SCA was given the mandate to review and analyse accreditation applications 
and to make recommendations to the ICC Members on the compliance with the Paris 
Principles by NHRIs.  
The importance of independent NHRIs is also emphasised by the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action which was adopted at the end of the Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights.13 The Vienna Programme of Action recognises the 
importance of the role played by NHRIs in the promotion and protection of human 
rights, disseminating human rights information and providing education about human 
rights.14 NHRIs supplement the role of other democratic institutions in ensuring that 
issues of human rights remain the central focus of political discourse in every society.15  
Over the years the United Nations has made concerted efforts to encourage States to 
focus on the domestic enforcement of human rights, and also by providing assistance in 
strengthening NHRIs.16 
 In Africa, donor support in the 1990s resulted in the establishment of several 
NHRIs to serve as independent bodies for the protection and promotion of human 
rights.17 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) provides for the 
creation of NHRIs by governments in Africa. Article 26 of the ACHPR states: 
State Parties to the Present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the 
Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions 
entrusted with the promotion and protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present 
Charter. 
As a result of the emergence of the NHRIs, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) also recognises the importance of NHRIs as 
institutions that are required to assist the African Commission in the promotion of 
human rights at country level.18 NHRIs affiliated to the African Commission have a role 
to play in the implementation of the ACHPR at the national level.19  They (NHRIs) are 
entitled to attend and participate in the African Commission’s public sessions and are 
12Pohjolainen AE The evolution of national human rights institutions: the role of the United Nations 
(Denmark: Danish Institute for Human Rights 2006) at 24. 
13Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted June 25 1993. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx (accessed 21 August 2013). 
14See para 36 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx (accessed 21 August 2013). 
15Kumar R “National human rights institutions: good governance perspectives on institutionalisation of 
human rights” (2003) 19:2 AM U INT’ L Rev 260 at 278. 
16See Reif (2000) at 4. 
17Viljoen F International human rights law in Africa 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) at 389. 
18ACHPR “National Human Rights Institutions”. Available at http://www.achpr.org/network/nhri/ 
(accessed 21 August 2013). 
19See Art 45 of the ACHPR. 
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required to submit reports on their activities to the African Commission every two 
years.20 
3 THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe establishes a number of institutions to help ensure the 
protection of the rights enshrined therein.21 These institutions, similarly to the South 
African model,22 are charged with supporting and entrenching human rights and 
democracy, promoting constitutionalism, protecting the sovereignty and interests of the 
people, securing and ensuring the observance of democratic values by the State and all 
institutions and agencies of government, and ensuring that all injustices are remedied.23 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees these institutions legal and operational 
independence and states that they are accountable to Parliament, are independent, and 
must perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.24 Although the other 
independent institutions25 mentioned in the Constitution also play a role in the 
protection and promotion of human rights, this article focuses on the ZHRC which has 
the primary role of promoting and protecting human rights in Zimbabwe.  
The Lancaster House Constitution provided for a Human Rights Commission26, 
but the ZHRC was only established in 2009, after 29 years of democracy. The ZHRC 
began to function in March 2010 when the President appointed the Chairman and other 
members of the Commission27, and became fully operational in 2012 after the passing of 
the enabling legislation.28  
 
20ACHRP “National Human Rights Institutions” Available at 
http://www.achpr.org/network/nhri/ (accessed 21 August 2013). 
21According to s 232 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, these institutions include: the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission, ZHRC, Zimbabwe Gender Commission, Zimbabwe Media Commission and National Peace 
and Reconciliation Commission.  
22S 181 of the Constitution of South Africa establishes a number of institutions, also known as the Chap 9 
institutions, which are independent organs with a general mandate of strengthening constitutional 
democracy in South Africa. These institutions are independent, subject only to the Constitution, 
accountable to Parliament, and must report on their activities and the performance of their functions to 
the House of Assembly at least once a year.  
23S 233 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
24S 235 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
25These institutions include: the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, Zimbabwe Media Commission and 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. 
26S 100R of the Lancaster House Constitution.  
27ZHRC “Bill watch: the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission”. Available at 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/billwatch120410.htm (accessed 21 August 2013). 
28Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2012.  
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4 FUNCTIONS OF THE ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION  
The functions of the ZHRC are dealt with under s243 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.29 
It provides that the ZHRC has a general mandate of promoting awareness and respect 
for human rights and the realisation of such rights. Arguably (as will be demonstrated 
below), the fact that the Constitution has established a fully operational Human Rights 
Commission with enabling legislation, will not automatically guarantee the effective 
protection and promotion of human rights. This contention is supported by Reif who 
notes: 
National human rights institutions may be established by a government with the best of 
intentions, such as when a state is making the transition to democratic government, or 
consolidating its democratic structure, or when established democracies wish to fine tune their 
institutions. However, national human rights institutions can be established by governments that 
are not democratic or by governments who want to give the appearance that they are taking 
steps to improve the human rights and administrative justice situation in their countries, while 
the reality is that there is little material change after the institution starts operations.30 
Thus, the success of the ZHRC in effectively protecting and promoting human rights 
goes deeper than its mere establishment. It should be noted that for the ZHRC to 
effectively discharge its functions, there are a number of factors, such as, legal, political, 
financial and social issues, that need to be addressed in order to ensure that the 
institution complies with the requirements set out under the Paris Principles. These key 
factors are discussed below. 
5 INDEPENDENCE  
Independence is key to ensuring that the ZHRC functions effectively. Independence is 
the attribute that underpins a national institution’s legitimacy and credibility and 
contributes to its effective discharge of its functions.31 The independence and 
impartiality of any NHRI have been frequently cited as prerequisites for their effective 
operation.32  The United Nations has also maintained that NHRIs must operate in such a 
manner that their independence is beyond reproach.33 On the subject of the 
independence of NHRIs, the Paris Principles stipulate: 
(1)The composition of the national institution and the appointment of its members, whether by 
means of an election or otherwise, shall be established in accordance with a procedure which 
affords all necessary guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of 
civilian society) involved in the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly by 
powers which will enable effective cooperation to be established with, or through the presence 
of, representatives of: (a) Non-governmental organisations responsible for human rights and 
efforts to combat racial discrimination, trade unions, concerned social and professional 
organisations, for example, associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists and eminent scientists; 
29S 243 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
30See Reif (2000) at 23. 
31See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 37. 
32See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 10. 
33See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 10. 
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(b) Trends in philosophical or religious though; (c) Universities and qualified experts; (d) 
Parliament; (e) Government departments (if these are included, their representatives should 
participate in the deliberations only in an advisory capacity). (2) The national institution shall 
have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its activities, in particular 
adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have its own staff and 
premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject to financial control 
which might affect its independence. (3) In order to ensure a stable mandate for the members of 
the national institution, without which there can be no real independence, their appointment 
shall be effected by an official act which shall establish the specific duration of the mandate. This 
mandate may be renewable, provided that the pluralism of the institution’s membership is 
ensured. 34 
Matshekga opines that the effectiveness of NHRIs primarily depends on their capacity to 
act independently of government, and on the institutions’ demonstrated ability to act 
independently of all other activities, governmental or not, that may impinge on their 
work.35 Importantly, Matshekga also notes that the issue of independence is a relative 
concept. He explains that NHRIs derive their powers from enabling legislation, are 
required to report to Parliament, and lack full financial autonomy which inhibits 
complete independence.36 Although the reporting obligations and the financial 
dependence are aimed at ensuring accountability, it is vital that restrictions on 
independence should be minimal.  
The United Nations Centre for Human Rights have put into place criteria for 
determining the independence of any NHRI. The criteria deals with questions such as 
the following: (a) Does the institution enjoy legal and operational independence? (b) 
Does the institution have clearly defined appointment and dismissal procedures? (c) 
Does it control its own finances? (d) Is it composed of individuals capable of acting 
independently?37 This criterion seeks to protect the independence of any NHRI. 
Governments must therefore respect these criteria in order to ensure and protect the 
independence of NHRIs. This applies to the ZHRC, too in order to ensure that it 
functions effectively. The discussion below focuses on crucial aspects of the 
independence of any NHRI and makes an analysis of the compliance by the ZHRC with 
the aspects of independence.  
5.1 Independence through Legal and Operational Independence 
The OHCHR has noted that the constitutional provision or law that establishes an 
institution should give it distinct legal personality.38 Such personality will allow the 
institution to make decisions independently and act independently.39 In order to 
enhance the operational independence of institutions, it is important that they must 
34S B(1) of the Paris Principles. 
35Motshekga J “Toothless bulldogs? the human rights commissions of Uganda and South Africa: a 
comparative study of their independence” (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 68 at 71. 
36See Motshekga (2002) at 71. 
37See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 10-12. 
38See OHCHR (2010) at 41. 
39See OHCHR (2010) at 41.  
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have the ability to conduct their day-to-day affairs independently of any outside 
influences.  The new Constitution of Zimbabwe establishes the ZHRC as an independent 
institution and forbids any individual from interfering with its functioning.40 The 
Constitution compels the ZHRC to be independent in the performance of its duties and 
not to be subject to the direction or control of anyone.41 The Constitution further states 
that the ZHRC must act in accordance with the Constitution and must exercise its 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice.42 In order to secure the operational 
independence of the ZHRC, the Constitution mandates the State and all other 
institutions and agencies of government at every level, through legislative and other 
measures to assist the ZHRC and to protect its independence, impartiality, integrity and 
effectiveness.43 The constitutional protection of the independence of the ZHRC seeks to 
ensure that it conducts its duties effectively and without any interference. The 
protection of such independence will greatly enhance the capability of the ZHRC to 
effectively protect and promote human rights. 
In order to enhance the operational independence of the ZHRC, the Constitution 
mandates members of the ZHRC to be non-political. The Constitution stipulates: 
(1) Members of the independent Commissions must not, in the exercise of their functions- (a) act 
in a partisan manner; (b) further the interests of any political party or cause; (c) prejudice the 
lawful interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms 
of any person.44 
The Constitution further states “that persons who are members of a political party or 
organisation on their appointment to an independent Commission (in this case the 
ZHRC) must relinquish that membership without delay and in any event within thirty 
days of their appointment”.45 The Constitution also states that “if a member of an 
independent Commission (ZHRC) who becomes a member of a political party or having 
been a member of a political party or organisation on his or her appointment to the 
commission, but fails to relinquish that membership within thirty days of the 
appointment, ceases immediately to be a member of the ZHRC”.46 
The protection of the legal and operational independence of the ZHRC is aimed at 
permitting it to exercise independent decision making power and to perform its 
functions without interference or obstruction from any branch of government or any 
public or private entity. Since the ZHRC is a newly-formed independent entity it is 
crucial that the provisions in the Constitution are adhered to.  This is to ensure that the 
ZHRC discharges its constitutional mandate independently and without any external 
40See s 242 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also s 235(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
41S 235(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
42Ss 235(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. It should be noted that in accordance with the 
Constitution, the ZHRC is however accountable to Parliament and this does not necessarily have any 
effect on its independence. 
43S 235(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
44S 236(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
45S 236(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
46Ss 236(3)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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interference. If this independence is maintained, there is no doubt that it will bode well 
for the future prospects of the ZHRC and enhance its constitutional obligations to 
effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.  
5.2 Independence through Appointments 
The method by which members of a NHRI are appointed is important in ensuring the 
independence of the institution. This is affirmed by the United Nations Centre for 
Human Rights which notes that the method by which members of national institutions 
are appointed is critical in ensuring independence.47 As a result, it is important that 
consideration should be given to entrusting the task to a representative body such as 
Parliament.48 The United Nations Centre for Human Rights also notes that the founding 
legislation of any NHRI must specify matters relating to the method of appointment, 
including the voting and other procedures to be followed.49 In line with the 
requirements of the Paris Principles50, the ICC SCA has noted the critical importance of 
selection and appointment in maintaining the independence of any NHRI. It has stated 
that the appointment and selection process must be transparent, broad consultations 
must be undertaken, vacancies have to be advertised widely, and that there is a need for 
maximising the number of potential candidates from a wide range of societal groups.51 
The ICC SCA has further noted that the appointment process is fundamental in ensuring 
the independence and effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the national 
institution.52 The selection process must be characterised by openness and 
transparency and should be under the control of a credible and independent body and 
involve open and fair consultation with the wider NGOs and civil society.53 
5.2.1 Constitution of Zimbabwe and Appointments 
In seeking to maintain and secure the independence of the ZHRC, it is important that the 
appointment of members of the ZHRC must be done in conformity with the Paris 
Principles and the ICC SCA General Observations. This will ensure impartiality in the 
appointment process and enhance the independence of the ZHRC. The Constitution of 
Zimbabwe sets out the criteria for the appointment of members of the ZHRC and the 
prerequisites for appointment such as nationality54, and the qualifications of members 
47See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 10. 
48See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 10. 
49See United Nations Centre for Human Rights (1995) at 10. 
50See s B(1) of the Paris Principles. 
51ICC SCA “General observations adopted in May 2013” (Geneva: ICC SCA 2013) at 29. Available at 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/Documents/ICC%20SCA%20General%20Observat
ions.pdf (accessed 23 September 2014). 
52See ICC SCA (2013) at 29. 
53See ICC SCA (2013) at 30. 
54See s 2(1) (a) of the First Schedule of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2002. 
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of the ZHRC.55 The Constitution recognises the importance of any member of the ZHRC 
having extensive knowledge of human rights issues and international law. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe stipulates that members of the ZHRC must be chosen for their 
integrity and their knowledge and understanding of, and experience in, the promotion 
of human rights.56 This provision is in accordance with the ICC SCA recommendations 
that advocate for the assessment of applicants on the basis of pre-determined, objective 
and publicly available criteria that promote transparency, pluralism and public 
confidence in the process.57 
5.2.2 Appointment of the Chairperson of the ZHRC 
In order to ensure that individuals of integrity are appointed to the ZHRC, it is crucial 
that impartiality is observed in the appointment process. However, the appointment 
process in Zimbabwe, particularly with regards to the appointment of the Chairperson 
of the ZHRC raises questions about its impartiality. In appointing the Chairperson of the 
ZHRC, the President is not bound by the advice of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) 
and the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.58 Section 242(3) of the Constitution 
states: 
If the appointment of a chairperson to the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission is not consistent 
with a recommendation of the JSC, the President must cause the Committee on Standing Rules 
and Orders to be informed as soon as practicable. 
The Constitution is, however, silent both on why the Committee on Standing Rules and 
Orders must be informed in such instance and the appropriate action that the 
Committee has to take if such a decision is made. It seems, thus that the President is 
given greater powers59 in the appointment of the Chairperson of the ZHRC. The silence 
regarding what ought to happen if the President omits to follow the recommendations 
of the JSC leaves scope for partiality. Concrete provisions are thus required to negate 
this. There is a likelihood that such powers might be used to appoint individuals that 
may be partisan and who will support the ideologies of the ruling party and interfere 
with the independence and functioning of the Commission. 
The independence of the ZHRC is arguably also less protected due to the lack of 
non-governmental organization (NGO) and civil society input in the appointment of the 
55S 242(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states: “The Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission must be a person who has been qualified for at least seven years to practise as a legal 
practitioner in Zimbabwe.” 
56S 242(4) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
57See ICC SCA (2013) at 30. 
58S 242(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
59It should be noted that this problem is not only unique to Zimbabwe as the same has been said about 
the appointment process in Uganda. Section 51(2) of the Constitution of Uganda stipulates that 
commissioners of the Ugandan Human Rights Commission (UHRC) are appointed by the President with 
the approval of Parliament.  Motshekga (2002), at 78, notes that although this procedure might over the 
years have worked well in practice, it is however flawed as it gives the President (executive) too much 
influence in the appointment process. This problem is further compounded by the lack of consultation 
with civil society.  
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Chairperson of the ZHRC. Contrary to the general observation of the ICC SCA, the 
Constitution does not cater for extensive consultation with members of NGOs and civil 
society in the appointment of the Chairperson of the ZHRC, and thus leaves the 
President with greater powers of appointment. Such a clause can therefore be used to 
intrude on the independence of the ZHRC. Perhaps the procedure adopted in Namibia 
where appointment of the Ombudsman (has a human rights mandate) is made by the 
President on the recommendation of the JSC could have been adopted.60 In South Africa, 
the President is bound by the recommendations of the National Assembly in the 
appointment of the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC). Such a procedure could also have been adopted in 
Zimbabwe.61 Arguably this would ensure accountability and checks and balances on the 
powers of the President, and would assist in ensuring that the independence of the 
ZHRC is protected. It would also make for a democratic process and thus bolster the 
integrity of the office. 
It should be noted that in the past the media have reported on alleged 
“questionable appointments.” Accusations of political allegiances have been made 
against a former Chairperson of the ZHRC, Jacob Mudenda, whose appointment caused 
controversy as there were allegations that constitutional procedures were not followed 
in his appointment.62 His credibility was also called into question as he was a former 
Governor of Matabeleland North during the Gukurahundi63 massacres. His political 
allegiance to the ruling party saw him being elected as a Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) Member of Parliament in the 2013 elections and 
subsequently as the Speaker of Parliament whilst holding the office of the Chairperson 
of the ZHRC.64 Such close ties with the ruling party and subsequent appointment to 
Parliament whilst still holding office at the ZHRC raise serious questions about the 
degree of independence of the ZHRC whilst he was in charge. These are crucial issues 
60See Art 90(1) of the Constitution of Namibia.  
61See s 6(1) of the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013. S 193(5) of the Constitution of 
South Africa states: “The National Assembly must recommend persons- (a) nominated by a committee of 
the Assembly proportionally composed of members of all parties represented in the Assembly; and (b) 
approved by the Assembly by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote- (i) of at least 60 per cent of 
the members of the Assembly, if the recommendation concerns the appointment of the Public Protector 
or the Auditor-General; or (ii) of a majority of members of the Assembly, if the recommendations 
concerns the appointment of a member of a Commission.” S 193(6) states: “The involvement of civil 
society in the recommendation process may be provided for as envisaged in section 59(1)(a).” 
62Mushava E “Mugabe, Tsvangirai misfire” Newsday 20 February 2013. Available at 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/ (accessed 22 August 2013). The 
Movement for Democratic Change led by Welshman Ncube, alleged that they were not consulted, nor was 
the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders consulted, in the appointment of the former Chairperson of 
the ZHRC. The appointment was, as a result, in violation of s237 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
63The Gukurahundi massacres took place at the height of the state of emergency and the Matebeleland 
civil war (Gukurahundi) in Zimbabwe. The Gukurahundi massacres resulted in thousands of individuals 
being killed, raped and tortured for dissident activities.  
64Mushava E “Mugabe, Tsvangirai misfire” Newsday 20 February 2013. Available at 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/ (accessed 22 August 2013). 
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that need to be addressed in order to ensure that non-political individuals who will seek 
to protect and preserve the independence of the Commission are appointed.  
Reif is of the view that the personal character of the person(s) appointed to head 
a Human Rights Commission is an important contributory factor in ensuring that the 
institution is able to discharge its duties effectively.65 The existence of close political 
links with any political party poses a great risk for the politicisation of any independent 
commission, thus raising questions about its independence. It is important that 
individuals with an established history of independence from government should be 
appointed to head human rights institutions.66 Therefore, any future appointments to 
the ZHRC must ensure that individuals with credible credentials, who are fit and proper 
and non-partisan are appointed to head the Commission. To ensure that non-partisan 
individuals are appointed, it is crucial that checks and balances need to be put into place 
to ensure that appointments made by the President are in accordance with provisions of 
the Constitution relating to an independent human rights institution. This will ensure 
that the independence of the institution is established and that individuals are able to 
carry out their duties in a non-partisan manner.  
5.2.3 Appointment of Other Members of the ZHRC 
The Constitution sets out a different criterion for the appointment of other members of 
the ZHRC.  It states that eight other members of the ZHRC are appointed by the 
President from a list of not fewer than 12 nominees submitted by the Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders.67 In line with the Paris Principles and the ICC SCA General 
Observations, the Constitution of Zimbabwe has put in place a selection process that 
seeks to ensure impartiality in the appointment of other members of the ZHRC. Section 
237(1) of the Constitution states:  
(1) For the purpose of nominating persons for any appointment to any independent Commission, 
the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders must- (a) advertise the position; (b) invite the 
public to make nominations; (c) conduct public interviews of prospective candidates; (d) prepare 
a list of the appropriate number of nominees for appointment; and (e) submit the list to the 
President. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe in regard to the appointment of other members of the 
ZHRC provides for broad consultation and participation, screening, selection, and an 
appointment process that seeks to promote transparency, pluralism and public 
confidence in the ZHRC. In line with the ICC SCA General Observations the advertising of 
vacancies maximises the potential number of candidates and hence promotes pluralism 
in the appointment process.68 The involvement of the public in the nomination process 
seeks to ensure that individuals of integrity and who are competent are appointed to 
65See Reif (2000) at 24. It should also be noted that allegations of corruption and close links with the 
ruling party have also been levelled against Mr Jacob Mudenda. 
66See Reif (2000) at 27. 
67S 242(1)(b). See also s 150(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe for the composition of the Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders.  
68See ICC SCA (2013) at 30. 
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serve on the Commission. The above procedure in section 237(1) of the Constitution 
seeks to ensure that the whole appointment process of other members of the ZHRC is 
transparent. The inclusion of this transparent appointment process should be 
applauded as it will go a long way to securing the independence of the institution. 
However, it is imperative that in practice such appointment process must be followed in 
order to secure the independence of the Commission.69 
5.2.4 Independence through Security of Tenure and Removal  
The ICC SCA in its General Observations has recognised the importance of security of 
tenure of members of an institution’s governing body as a means protecting its 
independence.70 It has noted that secure terms of office for members is an important 
guarantee of their independence so that they can develop expertise and be vocal 
without fear of hindering future prospects. The ICC SCA General Observations also 
require that the dismissal of a member of NHRIs should follow all substantive and 
procedural requirements, as prescribed by law, and should not solely be at the 
discretion of the appointing authorities.71 
Pursuant to the achievement of independence the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
envisions that members of the ZHRC are afforded an enabling free environment to 
discharge their duties without any political hindrance.72 Members of the Commission 
are therefore required to exercise their powers without fear of dismissal or non-re-
appointment. The Constitution in section 320(1) deals with the conditions of service of 
members of independent commissions. It states that “except as otherwise provided in 
this Constitution, every member of a Commission is appointed for a term of five years 
which is renewable for one additional term only”. The Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission Act, in the same manner as in other jurisdictions in Africa,73 guarantees the 
security of tenure of members of the ZHRC. This is so that members of the ZHRC are 
able to exercise their duties without any fear of being removed from office.74 
Commissioners thus have clearly defined terms of office in order to ensure that they 
discharge their duties without fear or favour. 
69It should be noted that despite the existence of such appointment procedures, reports have emerged on 
how the process has been circumvented by the ruling party in the appointment of members of the ZHRC 
and other independent Commissions. Accusations have been levelled against the President for ignoring 
recommendations made by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and proceeding to appoint 
applicants with strong links to the ruling ZANU-PF.  For more see Portal for Parliamentary Development 
“Zimbabwe: President subverts Gender Commission”  
http://www.agora-parl.org/news/zimbabwe-president-subverts-gender-commission (accessed 11 
August 2015). 
70See ICC SCA (2013) at 40. 
71See ICC SCA (2013) at 40. 
72S 235(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also s7 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission 
Act which deals with the independence and impartiality of the Commission and Commissioners.  
73See for example s10 of the Uganda Human Rights Commission Act 1997. 
74See s3(1) of the First Schedule of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2012 which states: 
“A Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for reappointment for 
another term of office not exceeding five years.” 
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More importantly, the Constitution protects members of any independent 
Commission from arbitrary removal from office75 and members of the ZHRC are granted 
immunity from prosecution.76 In line with the ICC SCA General Observations, the 
Constitution provides that a member of the ZHRC can only be removed from office when 
they are unable to perform the functions of the office through either physical or mental 
incapacity; gross incompetence; gross misconduct; or become ineligible for 
appointment to the Commission.77 The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 
stipulates that a commissioner shall be removed from office by the President if the 
question of his or her removal from office has been referred to a tribunal78 and that 
tribunal has advised the President that he or she ought to be removed from office.79 The 
Commissioners enjoy a status similar to that of judges in Zimbabwe and as a result can 
only be removed in accordance with the removal procedure of a judge.80  
Although the Constitution and the enabling legislation seek to protect the tenure 
of commissioners of the ZHRC by means of strict removal provisions, there are concerns 
about the involvement of the President in the removal process.81 There is a possibility 
that independence of the Commission might be compromised in the sense that the 
President is given too many powers in the removal process. The President is given the 
powers to solely appoint members of the tribunal to hear the question of the removal of 
a member of the Commission.82 Since the President solely constitutes the tribunal there 
is a chance that political considerations may play a part in the removing of 
commissioners. Thus, such powers pose a threat to the independence of the ZHRC. 
To secure the independence of the ZHRC, there is a need to have checks on the 
powers of the President in the dismissal and appointment of tribunal members. What is 
of concern is the exclusion of the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders, which plays 
a pivotal role in the appointment of commissioners in the removal process of the same 
75S 237(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also s20 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 
which deals with the removal of members of the Human Rights Commission. 
76S 21 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act states: “No legal proceedings shall lie against the 
Commission or any Commissioner or the Executive Secretary or any person acting under the direction of 
the Commission in respect of anything which is done in good faith and without gross negligence in 
pursuance of this Act.” 
77S 237(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
78According to s 20(4) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act, the tribunal shall consist of a 
chairperson (a person who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court) and two other 
members appointed by the President.  
79S 20(2) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act. 
80S 237(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also s187 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which deals 
with the removal procedures of judges in Zimbabwe. 
81For more see Chiduza L “Towards the protection of human rights: do the new Zimbabwean 
constitutional provisions on judicial independence suffice?” (2014) 17(1) PER/PELJ 368 at 387 where 
concerns are expressed about the powers of the President in the removal process of judges. 
82See s 20(4) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act states: “The tribunal referred to in this 
section shall consist of a chairperson and two other members appointed by the President...” 
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commissioners.83 In order to ensure impartiality and secure the independence of the 
ZHRC, the Constitution could have given the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders 
the powers to initiate and appoint members of a tribunal that would look at the 
question of the removal of a commissioner. Similarly to the appointment process, the 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders would then communicate the 
recommendations of the tribunal to the President on whether or not a commissioner 
ought to be removed from office. Such a process would thus ensure that impartiality is 
observed and also provide proper checks on the powers of the President. 
The procedure adopted in South Africa is a more preferable one; there the 
National Assembly plays a huge role in the appointment of members of independent 
commissions84, and is also given a central role in the removal process. Thus section 194 
of the Constitution of South Africa states: 
(1) The Public Protector, the Auditor-General or a member of a Commission established by this 
Chapter may be removed from office only on- (a) the ground of misconduct, incapacity or 
incompetence; (b) a finding to that effect by a committee of the National Assembly; and (c) the 
adoption by the Assembly of a resolution calling for that person’s removal from office; (2) (a) A 
resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal from office of (a) the Public 
Protector or the Auditor-General must be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of 
the members of the Assembly; or (b) a member of a Commission must be adopted with a 
supporting vote of the majority of the members of the Assembly;  (3) The President (a) may 
suspend a person from office at any time after the start of the proceedings of a committee of the 
National Assembly for the removal of that person; and (b) must remove a person from office 
upon adoption by the Assembly of the resolution calling for that person’s removal. 
The section above presents the role that is given to the National Assembly in the 
appointment and removal of members of independent institutions in South Africa. It is 
evident that the National Assembly is given a prominent role in the appointment and 
removal processes, and thus acts as a necessary check on the President in order to 
ensure and secure the independence of the Chapter 9 institutions. The powers of the 
President are thus significantly limited and are guided by the recommendations of the 
National Assembly. The same also applies in Namibia where the Ombudsman can only 
be removed from office before the expiry of his or her term by the President acting on 
the recommendations of the JSC.85 
5.2.5 Independence through Financial/Adequate Resources for the ZHRC 
It is important that a NHRI must have adequate resources, such as, human resources 
and adequate funding, in order to ensure the operational efficiency of the institution. 
The Paris Principles stipulate that NHRIs must be adequately funded so as to guarantee 
their independence. The purpose of such funding and a definition of what it entails are 
described by The Paris Principles as follows: 
83See s 242(1)(b) for the role of the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders in the appointment process 
of commissioners of the ZHRC.  
84See s 193(4) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
85Art 94(1) of the Constitution of Namibia. 
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The national institution shall have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its 
activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to 
have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject 
to financial control which might affect its independence.86 
Access to adequate financial resources and the ability to have control over these 
resources are prerequisites for the effective operation of NHRIs. The ICC SCA notes that 
since the provision of adequate funding is determined in part by the national financial 
climate, States have the duty to protect the most vulnerable members of society, who 
are often the victims of human rights violations, even in times of severe resource 
constraints.87 In line with the Paris Principles, the ICC SCA believes that irrespective of 
any financial constraints, there are certain aspects of the Paris Principles requirements 
that must be taken into account in any particular context. These requirements are 
summarised thus as: (a)The need for a national human rights institution to be accessible 
to the public; (b) need for salaries and benefits awarded to national human rights 
institutions to be comparable to those of civil servants performing similar tasks in other 
independent institutions of the State; (c) need to establish communications 
infrastructure; (d) adequate public funding to perform their mandated activities; (e) 
external funding should not constitute the institution’s core funding as it is the 
responsibility of the State to ensure that institution’s core budget.88 
Section 322 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe stipulates that Parliament ensure 
that sufficient funds are appropriated to all independent Commissions to enable them to 
exercise their functions effectively. Section 17 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission Act deals with the funding of the ZHRC. It states: 
(1)The funds of the Commission shall consist of – (a) moneys appropriated by Act of Parliament 
for the salaries and allowances payable to and in respect of members of the Commission and the 
recurrent administrative expenses of the Commission; and (b) any other moneys that may be 
payable to the Commission from moneys appropriated for the purpose by Act of Parliament; and 
(c) any donations, grants, bequests or loans made by any person or organisation or any 
government of any country to the Commission with the approval of the Minister; and (d) any 
other moneys that may vest in or accrue to the Commission, whether in terms of this Act or 
otherwise.  (2) The Commission shall apply its funds to the fulfilment of its functions… 
For the ZHRC to discharge its duties effectively, the government needs to ensure that 
the Commission has adequate resources, its members are adequately remunerated, that 
the institution itself is financially independent, and that any public funds should not be 
under the direct control of the government. However, due to the severe economic 
challenges in Zimbabwe, the ability of the ZHRC to function effectively has been 
adversely affected over the years. Such challenges have had a negative impact on the 
Commission, with the former Chairperson, Reg Austin, resigning and citing operational 
challenges, including lack of staff, office space, and the absence of political will.89 At the 
86S B(2) of the Paris Principles. 
87See ICC SCA (2013) at 35. 
88See ICC SCA (2013) at 34-35.  
89SAPA “Zimbabwe appoints new Rights, Elections Chief” News24 2 February 2013.Available at 
http://m.news24.com/news24/Africa/Zimbabwe/Zim-appoints-new-rights-election-chiefs-20130218 
(accessed 22 August 2013). 
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time of his resignation the former commissioner also stated that the Commission had 
“no budget, no accommodation, no mobility, and no staff.”90  In October 2014, the 
Chairman of the ZHRC, Elasto Mugwadi, also cited the lack of funding for the institution 
as a hindrance to the effective discharge of its duties.91 The Chairman noted that the 
Commission had received less than 10 per cent of its budgetary needs and that this had 
adversely affected the operational capacity of the institution.92 Donor support from the 
United Nations Development Fund, the European Union and the Danish Embassy has 
done little to ameliorate the dire financial situation of the ZHRC. Through donor support 
the Commission has secured offices in Harare to enable it to fully discharge its 
mandate.93 
It should be noted that the issue of inadequate funding is not only unique to 
Zimbabwe.94 Given the endemic human rights abuses in Zimbabwe it is all the more 
important that Zimbabwe has an effective Commission, and hence efforts need to be 
made by the State to ensure that the ZHRC is adequately funded.95 This will enhance its 
operational efficiency and independence and ensure that the institution discharges it 
duties without any fear or favour. There is an urgent need for the Zimbabwean 
government to address the issue of funding for the ZHRC in order to improve the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
Adequate remuneration needs to be provided in order to ensure professionalism 
within the institution.96 Due to the lack of resources, there have been reports that the 
90SAPA-AFP “Zimbabwe Human Rights chief resigns in protest” Mail and Guardian 29 December 2012. 
Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-29-zimbabwe-human-rights-chief-resigns-in-protest 
(accessed 18 November 2014.). 
91Zhangazha W “Paltry funding cripples Commissions” Zimbabwe Independent 24 December 2014. 
Available at http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/12/24/paltry-funding-cripples-commissions/ 
(accessed 10 January 2015). 
92Zhangazha W “Paltry funding cripples Commissions” Zimbabwe Independent 24 December 2014. 
Available at http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/12/24/paltry-funding-cripples-commissions/ 
(accessed 10 January 2015). 
93United Nations Development Programme in Zimbabwe “Capacity building support to the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission (ZHRC).”Available at 
http://www.zw.undp.org/content/zimbabwe/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/ca
pacity-building-support-to-the-zimbabwe-human-rights-commissio.html (accessed 31 July 2015). 
94A report by the SAHRC reveals that it was historically the underfunded. The limited resources have 
inevitably impacted on institutional performance and the realisation of the intended outcomes of the 
Commission. See SAHRC “Strategic Plan 2014 to 2017: Annual Performance Plan 2014/2015.” Available 
at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/SAHRC%20Strategic%20Plan%202014-
17%20and%20APP%202014-15a.pdf (accessed 18 November 2014). It should be noted that there are 
issues of inadequate funding for Human Rights Commissions in Africa. The history of the underfunding of 
human rights in Africa has been well documented over the years with major challenges in countries, such 
as, Uganda, Malawi, and Burundi. 
95For example, in Africa the SAHRC is viewed as one of the most adequately funded institutions which 
enjoy considerable independence. 
96S 320(6) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states: “Members of Commissions are entitled to such 
remuneration, allowances and other benefits as may be fixed by or under an Act of Parliament and their 
remuneration must not be reduced during the members’ tenure of office.” S 320(7) of the Constitution 
goes on to state that ‘’[t]he remuneration and allowances of members of Commissions are a charge on the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund.” 
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Treasury has at times failed to pay the salaries of commissioners and staff on time.97 
The lack of resources has also hampered the work of the Commission, and has resulted 
in the Commission being unable to address certain human rights issues within the 
country.98 Concerted efforts should be made to ensure that sufficient financial resources 
are made available to the Commission. Funds should therefore be made available either 
through local funding or through donations, grants or loans made by the government of 
any country in accordance with the provisions of the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission Act.99 
However, a major stumbling block to accessing donor funds in Zimbabwe is that 
the approval of the Minister is required before such funds can be given to the ZHRC.100 
This goes against the recommendations of the ICC SCA which is of the view that national 
institutions should not be required to obtain approval for external sources of funding, as 
this requirement may pose a threat to its independence.101 It is crucial that the ZHRC 
must be given autonomy to source external funding without the approval of the 
Minister as envisaged under the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act, and that 
financial systems be put in place to ensure accountability through regular financial 
reporting. Such accountability will ensure that the external funding sourced by the 
ZHRC does not compromise the independence of the ZHRC.  
6 ACCESSIBILITY 
The ICC SCA in its General Observations has noted that the proper funding of an NHRI is 
crucial in ensuring the accessibility of an NHRI. This is so because funding must be 
provided to secure premises and any other infrastructure required for the smooth 
operation of the institution.102 It should be noted that accessibility is also influenced by 
an informed public with regards to the existence of the Commission and the projects of 
the Commission.103 Accessibility of an NHRI is crucial particularly for the most 
vulnerable sections of society, who would have particular difficulty in drawing attention 
to any violation of human rights. In order to increase accessibility, it is also crucial that 
public information about the national institution and its method of work must be 
97Gumbo L “Human Rights Commission grounded” The Herald 23 June 2014. Available at 
http://www.herald.co.zw/human-rights-commission-grounded/ (accessed 18 November 2014). 
98Gumbo L “Human Rights Commission grounded” The Herald 23 June 2014. Available at 
http://www.herald.co.zw/human-rights-commission-grounded/ (accessed 18 November 2014). 
99It is crucial that in line with the ICC SCA recommendations, funding from external sources, such as 
international partners, should not constitute the core funding of the ZHRC as it is the responsibility of the 
State to do so. 
100See s 17(c) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2012. 
101See ICC SCA (2013) at 34. 
102See ICC SCA (2013) at 34. 
103It should be noted that in order to enhance the accessibility of any Human Rights Commission, that 
funding be available for public awareness campaigns and civic education campaigns.  
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accessible in print and audio in relevant languages.104 Accessibility can be improved 
through the opening of local offices in provinces and districts in order to ensure that 
victims of human rights violations are able to report such violations. The establishment 
of links with other human rights organisations also increases the accessibility of an 
NHRI as such other organisations can be used as a means of bringing forward any 
human rights violations. The employment of diverse staff from different cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds also aids in increasing accessibility of an NHRI.  
The accessibility factor requires that national human rights institutions must be 
accessible to citizens, with the public having knowledge of the institution and its 
physical location, and with diversity of composition.105 The accessibility of the ZHRC is 
crucial in order to ensure that individuals who are exposed to human rights violations 
or non-fulfilment of their rights can seek redress.106 Additionally, information should be 
readily available about the role and purpose of any Commission.  In order to enhance 
accessibility more provincial and district offices need to be opened across all the 
provinces in Zimbabwe.107 The opening of such offices should be effectively 
disseminated to the general populace through various forms of media. This will ensure 
that Zimbabweans are aware of the existence of such an institution and the purpose that 
it seeks to serve.  
The fact that the former Chairperson of the Commission, Reg Austin, cited the 
lack of resources for the Commission as one of his reasons for resignation highlights the 
challenges that await the ZHRC with regards to it being an accessible public 
institution.108 It is therefore crucial that efforts should be made to make the 
Commission accessible and such efforts should ensure that the work of the Commission 
is spread across the country. This will result in the Commission being able to effectively 
spread its work throughout the whole country and will also aid it in effectively 
discharging its constitutional mandate.  
 It is therefore imperative that adequate resources should be made available for 
such effort to take place. It is also important that in order to enhance the accessibility of 
the Commission, the appointment of staff to the Commission should reflect the diverse 
cultures in Zimbabwe in order to improve accessibility of the Commission. The 
accessibility of the Commission countrywide will also ensure that it is able to carry out 
104International Council on Human Rights Assessing the effectiveness of national human rights institutions 
(Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy 2005) at 16. 
105See Reif (2000) at 26. 
106See International Council on Human Rights (2005) at 16. 
107Currently there is the Northern Regional office which caters for the Harare Metropolis, Mashonaland 
Central, East and West and the Manicaland provinces. The Southern office covers the Bulawayo 
Metropolis, Matabeleland North and South, Midlands and Masvingo provinces. See Gumbo L “Human 
Rights Commission grounded” The Herald 23 June 2014. Available at http://www.herald.co.zw/human-
rights-commission-grounded/ (accessed 18 November 2014). 
108SAPA-AFP “Zimbabwe Human Rights chief resigns in protest” Mail and Guardian 29 December 2012. 
Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-29-zimbabwe-human-rights-chief-resigns-in-protest 
(accessed 18 November 2014.). 
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general education programmes on human rights issues for the general populace.109 
Such programmes will ensure that the people of Zimbabwe are made aware of human 
rights issues within the aim and scope of the Commission with regards to human rights 
promotion and protection. Such education programmes will therefore ensure that 
individuals know the exact steps to take when their rights are violated.110 
7 MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION 
The Paris Principles recognise that for an NHRI to be effective it must enjoy a clearly 
defined and appropriate mandate. Such mandate will ensure that that the community it 
serves is aware of its functions. Sections A(1) and (2) of the Paris Principles provide 
that a national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible to promote and 
protect human rights. Such mandate must be clearly provided in a constitutional or 
legislative text and must specify the composition and sphere of competence of the 
institution.  
The ICC SCA has further noted that all NHRIs should be legislatively mandated 
with specific functions to both promote111 and protect112 human rights.113 It has also 
gone further to note that the mandate of a national institution should be interpreted in a 
broad, liberal and purposive manner so as to promote a progressive definition of human 
rights.114 Section A(3) of the Paris Principles, which deals with the specific mandate of a 
national institution, states: 
A national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities: (a) To submit to the 
Government, Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the 
request of the authorities concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a matters 
without higher referral, opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters 
concerning the promotion and protection of human rights; the national institution may decide to 
publicise them; these opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports, as well as any 
prerogative of the national institution, shall relate to the following areas: (i) Any legislative or 
administrative provisions, as well as provisions relating to judicial organisations, intended to 
preserve and extend the protection of human rights; in that connection, the national institution 
shall examine the legislation and administrative provisions in force, as well as bills and 
109For example in South Africa the SAHRC has its headquarters in Johannesburg as well as regional offices 
which has improved its accessibility to the general populace. However, concerns have been raised that 
the regional offices, are located in urban areas, thus putting them far from rural villages.  
110It should be noted that at the moment there is no clear method of case uptake by the ZHRC and hence 
an evaluation of the method may be needed so that such information is readily available to the public. 
However, it should be noted that despite this uncertainty, the ZHRC has set up the Complaints Handling 
and Investigations Unit which is responsible for receiving all complaints that come to the Commission. 
The Unit is also responsible for investigating the reported cases.  
111The ICC SCA understands “promotion” to include “those functions which seek to create a society where 
human rights are more broadly understood and respected. Such functions may include education, 
training, advising, public outreach and advocacy”. 
112The ICC SCA understands ‘protection’ to include “functions that address and seek to prevent actual 
human rights violations. Such functions include monitoring, inquiring, investigating and reporting human 
rights violations, and may include individual complaint handling”. 
113See ICC SCA (2013) at 12. 
114See ICC SCA (2013) at 12. 
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proposals, and shall make such recommendations as it deems appropriate in order to ensure that 
these provisions conform to the fundamental principles of human rights; it shall, if necessary, 
recommend the adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in force and the 
adoption or amendment of administrative measures; (ii) Any situation of violation of human 
rights which it decides to take up; (iii) The preparation of reports on the national situation with 
regard to human rights in general, and on more specific matters; (iv) Drawing the attention of the 
Government to situations in any part of the country where human rights are violated and making 
proposals to it for initiatives to put an end to such situations and, where necessary, expressing an 
opinion on the positions and reactions of the Government.115 
Section A(3) of the Paris Principles goes further to provide for the mandate of national 
institution and includes mandates such as the following: 
(b) To promote and ensure the harmonisation of national legislation, regulations and practices 
with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective 
implementation; (c) To encourage ratification of the above-mentioned instruments or accession 
to those instruments, and to ensure their implementation; (d) To contribute to the reports which 
States are required to submit to the  United Nations bodies and committees, and to regional 
institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations and, where necessary, to express an opinion on 
the subject, with due respect to their independence; (e) To cooperate with the United Nations 
and any other organisation in the United Nations system, the regional institutions and the 
national institutions of other countries that are competent in the areas of the  protection and 
promotion of human rights; (f) To assist in the formulation of programmes for the teaching of, 
and research into, human rights and to take part in their execution in schools, universities and 
professional circles; (g) To publicise human rights and efforts to combat all forms of 
discrimination, in particular racial discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially 
through information and education and by making use of all press organs.116 
The ICC SCA has also endorsed the mandate under the Paris Principles and has also 
stated that any mandate of a national institution should include the following: 
[E]xtend to the acts and omissions of both the public and private sectors; -vest the national 
institution with the competence to freely address public opinion, raise public awareness on 
human rights issues and carry out education and training programs;-provide the authority to 
address recommendations to public authorities, to analyse the human rights situation in the 
country, and to obtain statements or documents in order to assess situations raising human 
rights issues; -authorise unannounced and free access to inspect and examine any public 
premises, documents, equipment and assets without prior written notice; -authorise the full 
investigation into alleged human rights violations, including the military, police and security 
officers.117 
The provision of such a broad mandate will ensure that an NHRI is able to conduct its 
duties of promoting and protecting human rights. 
7.1 Mandate of Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission 
The mandate of the ZHRC is dealt with under section 243 of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe. In line with the Paris Principles, the ZHRC is given a mandate to promote 
and protect fundamental rights. Section 243 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states: 
115S A(3) of the Paris Principles. 
116S A(3) of the Paris Principles. 
117See ICC SCA (2013) at 13. 
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(1) The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission has the following functions- (a) to promote 
awareness of and respect for human rights and freedoms at all levels of society; (b) to promote 
the protection, development and attainment of human rights and freedoms; (c) to monitor, 
assess and ensure observance of human rights and freedoms; (d) to receive and consider 
complaints from the public and to take such action in regard to the complaints as it considers 
appropriate; (e) to protect the public against abuse of power and maladministration by Sate and 
public institutions and by officers of those institutions; (f) to investigate the conduct of any 
authority or person, where it is alleged that any of the human rights and freedoms set out in the 
Declaration of Rights has been violated by the authority or person; (g) to secure appropriate 
redress, including recommending prosecution of offenders, where human rights or freedoms 
have been violated; (h) to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of 
suspected criminal violations of human rights or freedoms and to report to the Commission on 
the results of such investigation; (i) to recommend to Parliament effective measures to promote 
human rights and freedoms; (j) to conduct research into issues relating to human rights and 
freedoms and social justice; and (k) to visit and inspect-(i) prisons, places of detention, refugee 
camps and related facilities; and (ii) places where mentally disordered or intellectually 
handicapped persons are detained; in order to ascertain the conditions under which persons are 
kept there, and to make recommendations regarding those conditions to the Minister 
responsible for administering the law relating to those places. (2) The Commissioner-General of 
Police must comply with any directive given to him or her by the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission under subsection (1) (h). 
Section 4 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act118 also deals with the 
functions of the ZHRC. It states: 
In addition to the functions and powers set out in section 100R(6) and (7)119 of the Constitution, 
the Commission shall have the following functions and powers- (a) to conduct investigations on 
its own initiative or on receipt of complaints; (b) to visit and inspect prisons, places of detention, 
refugee camps and related facilities in order to ascertain the conditions under which inmates are 
kept there, and to make recommendations regarding those conditions to the Minister 
responsible for administering the law relating to those places or facilities; (c) to visit and inspect 
places where mentally disordered or intellectually handicapped persons are detained under any 
law in order to ascertain the conditions under which those persons are kept there, and to make 
recommendations regarding those conditions to the Minister responsible for administering the 
law relating to those places; and (d) to ensure and provide appropriate redress for the violations 
of human rights and for injustice; (e) to co-operate with human rights institutions belonging to 
international, continental or regional organisations of which Zimbabwe is a member.  
In accordance with the Paris Principles and the ICC SCA recommendations, the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe grants the ZHRC a broader mandate120 with regards to the 
protection and promotion of human rights. In accordance with the Paris Principles, the 
Commission is mandated to receive complaints on any alleged human rights violations 
in the country.121 The mandate of the ZHRC is comparable to the mandate of the SAHRC 
118Act 2 of 2012. 
119The sections referred to here are those of the Lancaster House Constitution which has since been 
replaced. There is a need therefore for the legislature to amend this provision and bring it in line with the 
provisions in the new Constitution. 
120The broad mandate of the ZHRC will ensure that there are no jurisdictional conflicts with other State 
institutions, and also ensure that the police and other security forces, and prisons which are often sources 
of human rights problems are included within the jurisdiction of the institution.  
121See s 243(1)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
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which is also conferred a broad mandate to ensure the effective promotion and 
protection of human rights in South Africa.122 
The ZHRC is empowered to be the driving force in human rights education. The 
Commission is also mandated with investigating the conduct of any person or authority, 
where it is alleged that any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration of 
Rights have been violated.123 The Commission is given the powers to gather information 
and evidence, and in the process of gathering such, the Commission is given a number of 
powers which include: requiring witnesses to appear before it124, and the power to visit 
all places of detention to ascertain the conditions of such places.125 In addition the 
Commission is mandated with securing the appropriate redress for complaints and 
recommend the prosecution of offenders, where human rights have been violated.126 
The Commission can also recommend the payment of compensation to individuals who 
are victims of human rights violations; and recommend that individuals seek redress in 
a court of law. The broader powers that are given to the Commission will therefore 
enable it to deal with individual cases and also ensure that violations of human rights 
are addressed. The constitutional guarantee of such powers will further enhance the 
promotion and protection of human rights and further ensure that the Commission is 
able to discharge its duties efficiently. 
It is crucial to note that the broadening of the rules of standing127 and the 
provision for the amicus curiae procedure128 have laid a solid platform for the ZHRC to 
be actively involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. The ZHRC should 
gain inspiration from the SAHRC which has over the years successfully acted as amicus 
curiae in a number of cases in South Africa, thus strengthening the culture of human 
rights protection.129 It should be noted that it is crucial that the government of 
Zimbabwe must ensure that adequate funding is given to the ZHRC so as to ensure that 
the institution is able to discharge its mandate effectively. The current underfunding of 
the institution and the lack of resources will greatly hamper the effectiveness of the 
institution which will lead to lack of public confidence in the ZHRC.  
122S 184 of the Constitution of South Africa deals with functions of the SAHRC. It states: “(1) The South 
African Human Rights Commission must: (a) promote respect for human rights and a culture of human 
rights; (b) promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights; and (c) monitor and 
assess the observance of human rights in the Republic. (2) The South African Human Rights Commission 
has the powers, as regulated by national legislation, necessary to perform its functions, including the 
power: (a) to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; (b) to take steps to secure 
appropriate redress where human rights have been violated; (c) to carry out research; and (d) to 
educate.’ See also s13 of the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 which deals further 
with the powers and functions of the SAHRC. 
123See s 243 (1) (e) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
124See s 241 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
125See ss 243(1)(k)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
126See s243(1)(g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
127S 85 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
128See s 85(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
129See the case of Government of Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC). 
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8 ACCOUNTABILITY 
The Paris Principles require that NHRIs should be responsible for the submitting to 
government, Parliament and any other competent body, reports on any matters 
concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.130 In accordance with the 
Paris Principles such reports shall relate to: recommendations on the creation or 
amendment of any legislative or administrative provisions, including Bills and 
proposals; any situation of violation of human rights; human rights in general and on 
more specific matters; and proposals to put an end to human rights violations, and its 
opinion on the proposals and reaction of government to these situations.131 The ICC SCA 
has furthermore noted that such reports and accountability of an NHRI serve to 
highlight key developments in the human rights situation in a country and provide a 
public account and effectiveness of an NHRI.132 
The ICC SCA has also reiterated the importance of the enabling legislation of a 
NHRI establish a process whereby the institution’s reports are required to be widely 
circulated, discussed and considered by the legislature.133 As such it is important that a 
NHRI should table its reports directly in the legislature so as to promote action on such 
reports.134 It is also crucial to note that these reports bear much significance for a NHRI 
to be accredited or re-accredited by the ICC SCA.  
It has been noted that the submission of reports by a NHRI seeks to ensure the 
accountability of the institution. The accountability of any independent institution 
dealing with human rights is essential in ensuring the effectiveness of such institution in 
the promotion and protection of human rights. Accountability is usually implemented 
by imposing a legal duty on the institutions to regularly report on their work to a State 
body directly (Parliament or Parliamentary Committees). Reif emphasises the point that 
accountability to the public is also essential and can be carried out by ensuring that 
annual and special reports are distributed in the public sphere and through the regular 
communication between the institution and complainants during investigations.135 
In seeking to enhance the accountability of the ZHRC, section 323 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe states: 
(1) Every Commission must submit to Parliament, through the responsible Minister, an annual 
report describing fully its operations and activities, the report being submitted not later than the 
end of March in the year following the year to which the report relates. (2) An Act of Parliament 
may require a Commission to submit further reports in addition to the annual report specified in 
subsection (1), and may prescribe the way in which such reports are to be submitted. 
 
130S A(3)(a) of the Paris Principles. 
131S A(3)(a) of the Paris Principles. 
132See ICC SCA (2013) at 37. 
133See ICC SCA (2013) at 37. 
134See ICC SCA (2013) at 37. 
135See Reif (2000) at 27.  
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Section 244 of the Constitution further provides: 
(1) The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission may require any person, institution or agency, 
whether belonging to or employed by the State or otherwise- (a) to inform the Commission of 
measures they have taken to give effect to the human rights and freedoms set out in the 
Declaration of Rights; and (b) to provide the Commission with information it needs to prepare 
any report required to be submitted to any regional or international body under any human 
rights convention, treaty or agreement to which Zimbabwe is a party. (2) In addition to the 
report it is required to submit in terms of section 323, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission 
may136, through the appropriate Minister, submit reports to Parliament on particular matters 
relating to human rights and freedoms which, in the Commission’s opinion, should be brought to 
the attention of Parliament. 
The above sections of the Constitution recognise the importance of the Commission to 
report to Parliament about its operations and activities. Parliament is given the legal 
duty to consider reports submitted by the ZHRC. In order to assist the ZHRC to 
effectively discharge its mandate, individuals, institutions and other agencies can be 
required by the ZHRC to table reports relating to human rights issues in Zimbabwe. It 
should be noted that the submission of reports to Parliament serves as a tool to inform 
it, as a valuable public record of the monitoring process. The reporting procedure 
amongst many issues enables the ZHRC to engage with organs of State on how to 
improve access to rights, educating them about their obligations, making well 
considered recommendations, raising public awareness, and identifying areas of 
priority for the next monitoring cycle.137 It can also be stated that essence of the 
Commission’s accountability to Parliament lies in not only reporting to Parliament but 
in the fact that the ZHRC will complement Parliament in its accountability and oversight 
role over the executive as well as in legislation monitoring.138 
The tabling of such reports will enhance the mandate of the ZHRC and also 
ensure that it is privy to the status of the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Zimbabwe. The reporting mechanism will strengthen the work of the Commission and 





136It should be noted that criticism can be drawn on the use of the word “may” in this context.  The use of 
such a word is weak and the submission of reports via the Minister can potentially compromise the 
“independence of the ZHRC” previously addressed in this article.  
137See SAHRC “Parliamentary accountability mechanisms for poverty reduction: the case of South Africa”.  
Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SForum/3sfMsMajodinaSouth%20Africa.pdf 
(accessed 11 August 2015). 
138See SAHRC “Parliamentary accountability mechanisms for poverty reduction: the case of South Africa”. 
Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SForum/3sfMsMajodinaSouth%20Africa.pdf 
(accessed 11 August 2015). 
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9 CO-OPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
AND OTHER DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 
9.1 Interaction with the International Human Rights System 
The ICC SCA has noted the importance of the Paris Principles139 in recognising the 
importance of monitoring and engaging with the international human rights system as 
an effective role for an NHRI in the promotion and protection of human rights 
domestically.140 The ICC SCA has stated: 
Depending on existing domestic priorities and resources, effective engagement with the 
international human rights system may include: submitting parallel or shadow reports to the 
Universal Periodic Review, Special Procedure mechanisms and Treaty Bodies Committees; 
making statements during debates before review bodies and Human Rights Council; assisting, 
facilitating and participating in country visits by United Nations experts, including special 
procedures mandate holders, treaty bodies, fact finding missions and commissions of inquiry; 
and monitoring and promoting implementation of relevant recommendations originating from 
the human rights system.141 
The ICC SCA has noted that such interaction with international bodies is an important 
dimension for the work of any NHRI. Interaction will enhance the effectiveness of an 
NHRI and its participation in regional and international co-ordination bodies will 
enhance its independence and effectiveness. International and regional co-operation 
will also ensure that an NHRI is able to monitor a State’s compliance with treaty 
obligations and a State’s reporting obligations under the Universal Periodic Review.142 
The ZHRC has identified the continued lack of funds for the Commission as a 
reason for its lack of progress in affiliating with international human rights bodies such 
as, the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions 
(ICC), the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions (NAHRI) and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Africa Commission).143 In order to 
enhance the effectiveness of the ZHRC, it is important that it establishes co-operation 
with other international human rights bodies in order to ensure the effective promotion 
and protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. It is crucial that the Commission should 
also comply with its reporting obligations internationally and regionally144 and that 
139See ss A(3)(d) and (e) of the Paris Principles. 
140See ICC SCA (2013) at 18. 
141See ICC SCA (2013) at 18. 
142See ICC SCA (2013) at 18. 
143ZHRC “Media engagement workshop- overview of the mandate and work of the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Commission” Available at http://www.zhrc.org.zw/index.php/2014-07-02-07-41-
38/speeches/59-media-engagement-workshop-overview-of-the-mandate-and-work-of-the-zimbabwe-
human-rights-commission-zhrc (accessed 11 August 2015).  
144As contemplated in s 244(1)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. It is important to note that although 
the ZHRC may be required to assist the State in preparing country reports, the ICC SCA recommends that 
an NHRI (ZHRC in this case) should neither prepare the country report nor should it report on behalf of 
the government. 
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such reports must be drafted independently for a true reflection of the state of human 
rights in Zimbabwe.  
9.2 Co-operation with Domestic Human Rights Bodies 
The ICC SCA has noted the importance of NHRIs to have regular and constructive 
engagement with all relevant domestic stakeholders in order to effectively fulfil their 
mandates.145 It has noted that NHRIs must develop and formalise and maintain working 
relationships with other domestic institutions established for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. These include sub-national statutory human rights 
institutions, thematic institutions, civil society and NGOs.146 Such co-operation with 
other human rights bodies is in accordance with the Paris Principles. The Principles 
require institutions to “maintain consultation with the other bodies, whether 
jurisdictional or otherwise, responsible for the promotion and protection of human 
rights”.147  
It should be noted that the Paris Principles recognise the fundamental role 
played by NGOs in expanding the work of NHRIs. The Principles thus encourage NHRIs 
to develop relations with NGOs that are devoted to the promotion and protection of 
human rights. Reif also supports this view and notes that in order to develop 
relationships and co-operation, it is essential for a Human Rights Commission to 
encourage co-operation and dialogue with NGOs and other institutions charged with 
human rights protection.148 Such co-operation will ensure the exchanging of views and 
information which should enhance the activities of a NHRI.149 NGOs play a crucial role in 
the promotion and protection of human rights150 and as such it is crucial that they work 
together with NHRIs to promote and protect human rights. 
It should be noted that previously civil society organisations in Zimbabwe faced 
a number of challenges as a result of government being suspicious of their activities as 
claims arose that they were working with the opposition to advance regime change in 
Zimbabwe.151 Thus, the work of a number of civil society organisations was severely 
curtailed through the enactment of repressive legislation, such as the Private Voluntary 
Organisations Act (PVOA).152 The Act was used to undermine NGOs involved in human 
rights work by requiring them to register with the then Ministry of Public Service, 
145See ICC SCA (2013) at 21. 
146See ICC SCA (2013) at 21. 
147Section C(f) and (g) of the Paris Principles. 
148See Reif (2000) at 16. 
149Welch CE NGOs and human rights: promise and performance (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press 2001) at 
5. 
150Marcinkute L “The role of human rights NGOs: human rights defenders or state sovereignty      
destroyers” (2011) 4:2 Baltic Journal of Law and Politics 52 at 54. 
151Chamboko M “ZANU- PF ban of NGO’S in Zimbabwe self-defeating” Nehanda Radio 19 February 2012. 
Available at http://nehandaradio.com/2012/02/19/zanu-pf-ban-of-ngos-in-zimbabwe-self-defeating/ 
(accessed 30 October 2013). 
152Act 22 of 2001/Chap 17:05. 
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Labour and Social Welfare or risk prosecution.153 However, despite such challenges it 
should be noted that the ZHRC has since it became fully operational realised the 
importance of civil society organisations in the promotion and protection of human 
rights. Over the years the ZHRC has engaged civil society organisations in various 
meetings in an effort to establishing working relationships that will improve the human 
rights situation in Zimbabwe.154 The ZHRC must therefore be commended for its 
diligent efforts in incorporating various members of civil society with regards to issues 
of human rights. Such efforts will encourage co-operation and will result in the 
exchanging of views and information which should enhance the activities of the ZHRC. It 
is worthy of note that the ZHRC has prioritised the continued engagement and 
collaboration with various civil society organisations on different human rights 
thematic issues.155 Such constant engagement will aid the ZHRC to effectively carry out 
its constitutional mandate.  
10 CONCLUSION 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises the important role of the ZHRC in human 
rights promotion and protection. It has thus put into place a framework that seeks to 
ensure that the Commission is able to effectively discharge its duties. Such framework 
should ensure that the Commission is able to discharge its mandate in the Constitution. 
The ZHRC has made considerable efforts to improve the promotion and protection of 
human rights. This can be seen from the efforts that the leadership of the ZHRC has 
made to establish relationships with the wider civil society in order to address the issue 
of human rights in Zimbabwe. Such efforts will therefore enhance the capacity of the 
ZHRC to effectively carry out its broader mandate with regards to human right 
promotion and protection. However, despite being an independent institution, there are 
a number of challenges that might threaten the institution in effectively discharging its 
mandate. In order to guarantee the independence of the ZHRC, well-qualified 
individuals with no political links are to be appointed. There is need to ensure that the 
Commission is adequately funded so as to ensure that it is able to discharge its 
constitutional obligations without any hindrance. This will ensure that the ZHRC in 
collaboration with other human rights stakeholders is able to contribute positively in 
addressing the human rights situation in Zimbabwe.   
153See s 6 of the PVOA. 
154ZHRC “Media engagement workshop- overview of the mandate and work of the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Commission” Available at http://www.zhrc.org.zw/index.php/2014-07-02-07-41-
38/speeches/59-media-engagement-workshop-overview-of-the-mandate-and-work-of-the-zimbabwe-
human-rights-commission-zhrc (accessed 11 August 2015).  
155ZHRC “Media engagement workshop- overview of the mandate and work of the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Commission” Available at http://www.zhrc.org.zw/index.php/2014-07-02-07-41-
38/speeches/59-media-engagement-workshop-overview-of-the-mandate-and-work-of-the-zimbabwe-
human-rights-commission-zhrc (accessed 11 August 2015).   
 
Page | 174  
 
                                                 
